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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASH. D.C. 20520

February 6, 1980

Mr. Harry Schrecengost
Defense Technical Information
Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Va. 22314

Dear Mr. Schrecengost:

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Permission is also granted to further disseminate these documents into the private sector through the National Technical Information Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Sincerely,

Edward N. Lundstrom
Edward N. Lundstrom
Research Documentation Officer
Office of External Research
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

The purpose of this paper is to present an integrated picture of the Arab minority's total adjustment--social, cultural, psychological, economical, and even biological--to life in Israel. We will approach culture change not from the culturologist's viewpoint as new culture traits, themes, complexes, etc., invading new geographical areas or new people. We will rather look at it from the opposite end--organisms, that happened to be of the human species, finding themselves in a changing environment and attempting to adjust to these changes, using all the means and the equipment they have, socio-cultural change being a major aspect of the total adjustment. Adjustment or adaptation is generally thought of as being made by the organism in response to negative or harmful changes in the environment. A change in the environment which is threatening to the organism physically or by jeopardizing his vested interests and his existing modes of adjustment of course triggers changes toward new adjustment. However, changes in the environment which appear as new opportunities, new chances for better satisfaction of needs and for reaching desired goals, also trigger adjustments by the organism in the form of attempts to take better advantage of the new opportunities.

Phrased in terms of our study we are simply saying that a contact situation between two groups triggers new adjustments whether the new situation is seen as threatening or as presenting new and welcome opportunities. We are also suggesting that members of the same group do not "read" the same contact situation similarly. A people, a nation, a

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group, a community does not respond to contact situation as one solid block nor even as a homogeneous body. At the same level each individual is unique; his perception of the threats and the opportunities in the new situation is unique, and accordingly his adjustment to the new situation is unique. In other respects all members of a nation, a group or a community share the same common perceptions and common adjustments.

In between several levels exist. We do not here want to get involved in a theoretical discussion of what determines the nature of each response or each item of behavior by a human being or any other organism for that matter. It would possibly be an acceptable simplification, however, to say that ultimately what is common or unique in the responses or adjustments made by different units at the different levels of organization is determined by the amount of shared items in the so-called "Images" (Boulding, ¹⁹⁶⁴ 1956), "Cognitive Maps," "Mazeway" (Wallace, 1970), or "Plans" (Miller, et. al., 1960) of the individuals forming each of the groups at that level.

Whatever the determinants of the patterned differences in adjustments of differences in adjustments of different sub-groups to the same contact situation may be, the differences themselves are real and observable. The theoretical and practical implications of these patterned differences, however, have not been well realized. Linton mentioned some of these implications as far back as 1943 when he wrote:

"The generalizations so far developed have been based upon the hypothesis that societies are homogeneous and react as wholes to contact situations. Very frequently this is not the case, especially in societies which have a well-developed class organization. In such societies nativistic tendencies will be strongest in those classes or individuals who occupy a favored position and who feel this position threatened by culture change.... This condition can be observed in many immigrant groups in America where individuals who enjoyed high status in the old European

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society attempt to perpetuate the patterns of that society while those who were of low status do their best to become Americanized. (Linton, 1943: 239)

It is surprising that Linton's insights in this respect have not been picked up and developed further by other anthropologists.

In this paper we will use the differences in the adjustment patterns of the three sub-groups of an Israeli-Arab village to study the relationship between mental health, culture change and perception of the contact situation.

We will try to show how the borders of the different socio-cultural adjustments coincide with the borders of parallel psychological adjustments and both coincide with different ways of perceiving the contact situation. We will also try to show that the first two are the necessary and logical (or psychological) correlates of the third and that poor psychological adjustment is part of poor over-all adjustment to the new situation and is not necessarily associated with high degree of modernity or change.

The Arab minority in Israel is probably the fastest modernizing and changing group in the Middle East today. The change is generated through the somewhat sudden and very intensive contact of this previously traditional Middle Eastern peasant agricultural group with a highly modernized and Westernized society; the Israeli Jewish society.

The rest of this paper consists of two major parts. The first part consists of a very brief survey of the circumstances which led up to the present contact situation, followed by an over view of the situation of the Arab minority in Israel and the village where most of the actual research on which this paper is based was done.

The second part consists of a fairly detailed description of the major adjustment strategies used by the different groups among the Arab minority in their attempt to cope with the new situation in which they found themselves.

History of Contact

The roots of the present contact between Arabs and Jews in Palestine go very deep in the history of the area and of the two peoples. The Hebrews lived and ruled in the land known as Palestine for about 13 centuries beginning in the 12th Century B.C. In 135 A.D. the Romans destroyed Jerusalem and turned Palestine into a Roman colony barred to the Jews. The Romans ruled the country for six centuries to be finally defeated by the Moslem forces about the middle of the 7th Century A.D. From that time up to 1948, Palestine was populated by Arab or highly Arabized populations and up to the beginning of the 16th Century was ruled by Moslem dynasties centered in Damascus, Bagdad or Cairo. In 1517 the Ottoman Turks conquered the area and their rule lasted for the next four centuries. The First World War ended the Ottoman rule and resulted in a British Mandate over Palestine which lasted up to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.

The Zionist movement which ultimately led to the establishment of Israel, started originally among European Jews as a socio-political response to discrimination against Jews, practiced most strongly in Germany and Russia, and was part and parcel of the general European colonizing and nationalist spirit of the time. Ironically enough, Arab nationalism of the late 19th Century was inspired by, and came as a response to the same European nationalist, democratic ideology that inspired Jewish nationalism in Europe. Arab nationalism, especially in

Palestine and neighboring Arab regions, became later much more defined and crystallized in response to Jewish nationalism and through the Arab-Jewish conflict.

The Zionist dream of establishing a Jewish national home in Palestine received its first official international recognition through the "Balfour Declaration" of 1917. Thirty years later the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution accepting a scheme for the partitioning of Palestine and the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish states. Palestinian Arabs opposed from the very beginning the establishment of a Jewish homeland in what they considered to be totally their country. They expressed their opposition by many methods including demonstrations and riots which occasionally reached the dimensions of a civil war and resulted in bloody massacres. The 1948 war turned about a million of them into refugees and destroyed their ability for resistance only to re-emerge recently in the form of guerrilla organizations. About 170 thousand of them stayed in Israel occupied territories and became Israeli citizens.

The Arab Minority

The term "Arab Minority" in this study refers only to Palestinian Arabs who stayed inside Israel after 1948 and became Israeli citizens. Their number is estimated to have been about 150-170 thousand in 1948. Since then, they have maintained a growth rate of about 4 percent, one of the highest in the world, bringing their number to about 400 thousand by 1970. They tend to have large families and are a very young population with the median age of 14.8 years.

The Arab minority in Israel consists of three groups, Moslems (70%), Christians (20%), and Druzo (10%). The three groups are very

similar culturally and racially. The Druzes receive special treatment from the Israeli authorities and have recently been accorded complete equality with Israeli Jews and are subject to the draft. Christians are accepted in the Israeli Army but Moslems, with the exception of few Bedonians, are not.

About 75% of the Arab minority live in rural areas, in 100 all-Arab villages. The other 25% live in two all-Arab towns and in six "mixed" cities. Those in the "mixed" cities live mainly in the slums or semi-slum areas of these cities. The all-Arab towns and villages are concentrated in two major areas, Galilee and the Little Triangle. These areas of Arab concentration seem, however, to be gradually and purposefully diluted by the introduction of new Jewish settlements in the heart of these areas.

From the very beginning, the Arab inhabitants of Israel were treated differently from Jewish inhabitants. The reasons usually given are the security of the state and the protection of the Arab minority itself.

In other aspects not related to security, Arabs are kept separate. A separate office for Arabs exists in every department and at every level, from the office of the Prime Minister all the way down to local level offices in the "mixed" cities.

Education in Israel is free and compulsory for all children aged 5 to 15 but Arab schools are administered separately and generally have inferior facilities. Compulsory education is not as strictly enforced in the Arab sector as in the Jewish sector, and the Arab minority in general has a much lower level of education than the Jewish population.

The Arab village in Israel is gradually becoming part of the larger economical system of the country as a whole and the sources of liveli-

hood are increasingly shifting from village to town and from agriculture to industrial and construction labor. By 1961, more than half of the Arab labor force worked outside their regular place of residence.

Arab laborers were not accepted in the Histadrut (Israel General Federation of Labor) until 1957 when they were admitted to a "Separate but equal" status. The reason for this is that Arab laborers do not support the Zionist philosophy of the Histadrut.

Other than industrial and construction labor in Jewish towns, agriculture is the most important source of income for Arabs. Despite significant advancement in tools and techniques, Arab agriculture is still less developed than that of the Jewish sector. This is partly due to the lack of irrigation.

There is generally a very high rate of unemployment among the better educated Arabs because they usually refuse to work in agriculture or construction, which leaves teaching in Arab schools as the only kind of work open to them. With the exception of the Communist Party, Arabs were not accepted to any of the Israeli political parties, mainly because of the Zionist philosophy and orientation of those parties. Nor have the Arabs been allowed to form their own party; any attempts in that direction were firmly and thoroughly crushed. The only thing similiar to an Arab party in Israel today is "RAQAH" the Arab faction of the original Communist Party which split in 1965 over nationalist issues.

The Village

Al-Karya, where most of the research was carried out, is located in the northern part of Israel with a population of 5,327 in 1969, all of whom are Arabs, mostly Moslems with few Christian families. It is known

that Al-Karya has been inhabited by Moslem and Christian Arabs at least since the early days of the Bizanteens.

According to the U.N. decision of 1947, Al-Karya was supposed to become part of the Arab section of Palestine. However, it was occupied without any fighting, together with several neighboring villages, by the Israeli forces in 1948. Originally the village depended totally on farming but presently more than half of the breadwinners work in Jewish towns, mainly as construction laborers.

Al-Karya is in the center of a cluster of Arab villages which together form one of the main concentrations of Arab villages in Israel. The closest sizable Jewish town is about 30 miles from Al-Karya.

Adjustment Strategies:

The description of the three types of adjustments appearing in this chapter is derived mainly from the study of one single village which we have called Al-Karya. The types of adjustment is not determined by an individual's hamula, but cuts across hamulas dividing each into three classes. The generalizations made here apply to the different classes of all hamulas in the village. It is the contention of the present investigator that these generalizations apply equally well to all the Israeli-Arab villages with some slight differences in the details of the adjustments or in the sizes of the different classes, depending on such factors as distance from Jewish towns, amount of land owned by the village, and number of people who left the village in 1948 and so on.

The description of the adjustment patterns in Al-Karya would not, however, be applicable to the Bedouin communities in Israel nor to the Arab communities living in the "mixed" cities. We shall comment very briefly on these two groups toward the end of this paper.

Three points should be kept in mind while discussing the different adjustments among the Arab minority. The first of these is that culture change has a dimension which we may call direction. This means that, at least in the short run, there is no universal pattern to culture change. Culture does not always improve, progress, move from primitive to civilized, from traditional to modern or follow any predetermined simple scheme. Thus in the case of contact between a modern and a so-called traditional or non-Western culture it is usually assumed the traditional culture can either stay traditional or become modern to varying degrees. This, of course, is not true; there is a wide variety of directions that the change can take. Some of the possible directions were pointed out by Linton (1943) in his discussion of "Nativistic Movements," and by Devereux and Loeb (1943) in their study of "Antagonistic Acculturation," and we will have a chance to meet some of these later in this paper.

The second point is that human beings do not accept or reject a cultural item, whether it is a physical object, a behavioral item or an idea, only or even mainly on the item's own objective qualities and what it can or cannot do for them. Each cultural item is seen by man as being also a symbol of the acceptance or rejection of an item from another culture as a message about a relationship between the two groups, the lender and the borrower. We should, therefore, be aware of "the distinction between resistance to the borrowing or lending of specific cultural items as such, and resistance to, or antagonism toward, the prospective lender or borrower." (Devereux and Loeb, 1943: 34).

The third point is that the perceptions, attitudes, and views of the different Arab groups toward Jews, the West, and the contact situation in general, are the results of the long time historical processes described

in the previous chapters. Keeping this in mind would make the material in the rest of this paper much more meaningful.

The division or classification of the people in Al-Karya which is most real to the minds of the village people themselves is that which follows the lines of the traditional social structure. This would mean the classification of the village people as a whole into hamulas, the people of each hamula into clans, and the people of each clan into extended family and each extended family into nuclear families, and of these into individuals. This classification does not, however, seem to be the main determinant of how individuals viewed the meaning of their living in Israel. In other words, all the people of the same hamula do not view this situation similarly. The classification which accounts better for similarities in the perception of the situation is more along the lines of socio-economical classes which cut across hamulas. In other words, members who belong to the same class--the classes will be determined soon--but to different hamulas have more in common in terms of the way they perceive the situation and consequently the type of adjustment they make, than those who belong to the same hamula but to different classes. Below the hamula level the class lines do not cross the kinship group lines. In other words, all members of a clan, or an extended family, tend to belong to the same class. Each hamula, on the other hand, has one or more clans falling in each of the socio-economic classes. Of course, there are exceptions to this, such as small hamulas which consist of less clans than there are classes. The number of classes is three and they will be identified here as upper, middle and lower.

The major determinant of class membership appears to have been the amount of land which was owned by the members of each class before the beginning of the Israeli-Arab war which resulted in the establishment of the State of Israel. Land, at that time, was the only significant source of income for the peasant villagers and it was the amount of land owned which allowed for the significant differences in the total style of life or total adjustment among the three classes. The amount of land owned must have caused, or at least was correlated with factors significant enough to have caused parallel differences in the way the different groups viewed the world in relation to themselves. This in turn resulted in differences in the way the different classes viewed the Jewish people and the contact situation when it came.

Before we describe the unique adjustments of each of these classes we should mention that at the higher level of organization, namely, as an Arab minority in Israel, they all share some common assumptions about, and attitudes toward Israel and the Jews. These are the results of the common history and the common identifications described briefly in the previous section, which put all three classes in one as Arabs versus Jews. Some of these shared assumptions are: (1) That Arabs and Jews are two completely and clearly distinct peoples which are mutually exclusive in every respect. (2) That the interests of Jews and Arabs are contradictory and exclusive of each other and can be satisfied only at the expense of each other. (3) That Israel is a Jewish state established by Jews and for Jews at the expense of the Arab people. Arabs, therefore, are not wanted in Israel, nor do they belong outside their own community. (4) The Israeli policy is based on the intent of getting rid of them sooner or later. (5) In case of the Israelis loosing a war

with the Arab countries, they would possibly kill all the Arabs in Israel.

(6) That the existence of Israel is somehow unnatural, a freak of history, and is temporary. (7) That injustice has been done to the Arab people by the international community at the hands of the Jews. (8) That some day things will return to normal, the injustice will be undone, Palestinians will return to their homes and Jews will continue to live there as an ethnic group but not as an independent state. (9) That the Arabs in Israel are an integral part of a larger unit, the Arab nation, and that they are only artificially and temporarily separated from that larger unit.

These are some of the assumptions underlying the overall adjustment of the Arab minority in general to life in Israel. Most of the villagers are, of course, not conscious that they are making such assumptions and would not be able to articulate them if they were asked to. The assumptions could, however, be easily inferred from the observation of their every-day behavior or conversations. To give only a few examples, one can hear the village people making such matter of fact statements as: "When the refugees get back...", or "When the situation changes...", "When the problem is solved...." One can also always hear new prophecies about the coming of the end of Israel and every time they come close to the deadline, new prophecies appear extending the deadline for a few more years.

Israeli Arabs refuse to buy, lease on long terms, or in any way make any long term investments in lands or properties which once belonged to people who are now refugees outside Israel because, as they often put it, "What would you do when the rightful owner comes back?"

These assumptions or conceptions are shared by members of all three classes. Other assumptions, unique to each of the three classes will be mentioned as we describe the total adjustment of each class.

We will start with the upper class then the lower class because the adjustments of these two classes are more closely tied up together than is either of them with the middle class. These two classes represent only a small percentage of the population, each. Finally we will discuss the middle class which includes the large majority of the Arabs in Israel.

The adjustment of the upper class:

As was previously stated, these were the owners of most of the land in the village although they made up possibly no more than five to ten percent of the village population. The land ownership allowed for a style of life which differed quite a bit from that of the other two classes. Generally, they considered themselves, and were considered by the villagers and by everyone that had anything to do with the village, as the cream of the peasant society. As such they were the leaders in all aspects of the village life. To start with as physical specimens they were considered the best--clean, pure, beautiful and just to have that biologically aristocratic look about them. They were also supposed to be the descendants of "ancient" good families which made them by birth decent and honorable. Even they were supposed to be experts in every field of life and the rest of the villagers ran to them with any problem they ever encountered. Above all, they were what we may call rulers and manipulators of men, and human relations managers.

They were above doing any physical or manual work. All the physical work was done by members of the lower class, both in the fields and at

home. They, however, as experts supervised the work from a distance. They told the workers what to do and how to do it. For example, they told what to plant and the right location and season for it, what to harvest when, and how to rotate the crops, what to do with the crops and so on. When there was not much work in the fields these workers and their wives and children turned into domestic servants and did most of the chores at home. They even fulfilled the job of police or law enforcement force.

What members of this class did mostly was to run their guest-house-men's-club called "Diwan" and the larger ones called "Zawya" from which they ran the affairs of their hamulas and the village in general. This usually was a large room with carpets and mattresses on the floor for seating a large number of men during the day and sleeping a large number at night. Black coffee was kept hot and ready 24 hours a day, and meals served at every meal time to every one who happened to be there. This was the beating heart of the hamula, where the men gathered every day, for most of the day, to drink coffee, chat, bring up their problems, discuss the weather, the crops, hamula affairs, village and world affairs.

The newspaper, when ever it was available, was read here. This happened usually when the "Sheikh" or one of his close relatives happened to have been in the city of Acre or Haifa and brought the paper back with him. These were important and serious occasions. Because the paper and the visits of the "Sheikh" or one of his relatives to the city formed one of the most significant connections with the outside world. The "Sheikh" would talk about the city people he met and talked to, about the official and how he discussed the village affairs with them, about the market place and other places he visited, and so on. The

admiring villagers marvelled at the skill and knowledge of their leader.

The paper then was read by one of the "Sheikh's" sons or close relatives who usually was the only person capable of reading or writing and who usually was sent to school maybe for a few years in the city, with the specific purpose of becoming a sort of "assistant for foreign affairs." The "Sheikh" would comment on the items from the paper in light of what he had heard in the city and the village. Men would listen carefully and then ask many questions about the meaning and the implications of what was said. The only other contact that the villager had with the outside world was also mediated by the "Sheikh" and his close relatives. This channel was the guests who came to the "Diwan" or "Zawya." The Sheikh's diwan was the only place in each hamula equipped for, and economically capable of receiving guests. Any stranger coming into the village, whatever his purpose may be, was automatically directed to the diwan. Even in the rare occasions when a member of the other two classes had a personal guest, the guest was usually brought to the diwan to be entertained with other men and maybe to eat and sleep. There were possibly few days that the diwan did not have at least one "guest" and sometimes there were up to fifty "guests." The guests as we said included every outsider who ever visited the village. These included personal guests of the Sheikh or his close relatives--the only ones who had friends from outside the village. But the guests also included peddlers of any kind, religious men roaming the countryside, tax collectors, stranded taxi drivers, merchants of cattle or other animals, a doctor brought to the village for an emergency, a variety of employees of the British mandate government, police officers,

smugglers, British soldiers, Jewish "tourists" with maps and back-packs, Jewish "boy scouts" who were members of the pioneering youth organization, and on and on. The Sheikh and his worldly well-informed close relatives, in these cases sat and chatted with the guests, especially if these were very important such as police officers or government functionaries, while the other villagers listened, admired and learned. Due to their contacts with and knowledge about the outside world the Sheikh and his close relatives served as mediators between the villagers and the unknown world which started at the end of the village fields. Members of this class were the only one's in the village who knew how to talk to police officers or to any government officials, how to hire a lawyer, to locate a doctor's office, to sue someone in court, to deal with a bank, to bargain with merchants, to eat in a restaurant, to hire a taxi. They knew their way around the city; it was a familiar world to them, or at least they so convinced the villagers.

Due to all these advantages members of this class acquired a lot of power over the lives of the other villagers and had the capacity to reward or punish, sometimes even physically. With that power they ruled and regulated the lives of the villagers. These aristocrats in turn answered to the British government.

Also due to contacts with the outside world, and to their economical situation members of this class were the innovators and the introducers of everything from the modern or western world, to the villager. They saw what city people did and they imitated them. They admired and envied the city people and knew the rest of the villagers felt even more inferior toward the city people than they did. By borrowing and introducing what they saw as symbols of city life "Madani," members of

this class proved their superiority to the other villagers. Thus members of this class were the first to let their children wear European style clothes, the first to bring radios into the village, the first to buy European style furniture, books, newspapers, ready-made shoes, fountain pens, wrist watches, alarm clocks. They were also the first and, for a long time the only ones, to send their children to schools in the city.

As heads of hamulas members of this class' identity went much beyond the village. They identified themselves with heads of the other villages, with city aristocrats, with tribal chiefs and even with kings of Arab countries like Jordan, Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, who themselves were not much more than tribal chiefs. This identification was with a class and with a style of life; it was not by any means Arab nationalism.

Nationalism would have meant identifying with the peasants and the masses which they would not want to do. Up to this date they have never converted to Arab nationalism and neither Nasser nor Arafat ever commanded their respect. Their loyalty is still with Hussain, the bedouin chief, the aristocrat and king.

The Jews to them always were and still are an ethnic and religious group which produced most of the prophets mentioned in the "Koran." A group whom they could respect and get along with, had they--the Jews--stayed in their place, nice and peaceful minding their own business like other ethnic or religious groups in the area, let us say the Druze, the Sharkas, or the Armenians. They all had chiefs and heads who were respectable enough and with whom they dealt as equals. That also was the way they saw and dealt with the leaders of the Jewish communities. And when the Jews started to become openly troublesome during the 30's

and 40's they were not seen as a political movement as the Zionist organization, as an international force. They were seen as a local ethnic-religious group which was getting "uppity" possibly encouraged by the British, those foxes who followed the policy of divide and rule, and always created conflict between the different ethnic-religious groups using Druze against Sheites, Marenites against Moslems and so on. This time it was Jew against Arabs. It was a local not an international issue. Each village headman can arm the men of his hamula or village and take care of the Jews in his area.

They knew how to do it. All they needed was to get to Amman, Beirut, or Damascus and get from the other Arab emirs, chiefs or kings some guns for their village men and the problem would be taken care of. It could even be done with sticks and stones. After all it was done before when members of other non-Arabic or non-Moslem groups in the area threatened the interests of the same village or tribal heads.

The villagers bought few rifles, one each family. These were of a wide variety, British, French, German. Canadian ones were, for some reason, especially popular. Some were so old their origin was unknown. The chiefly families even got themselves some automatic weapons of which they were extremely proud. Whenever Jews were suspected to be in the area the village crier ran in the streets screaming: Jews south of the village or in such and such location. The villager took out their guns and ran in the specified direction, shooting at anything that looked suspicious to them.

Naturally, more villagers and farm animals got killed than Jews. Some villagers took advantage of these situations to settle some old accounts with their fellow villagers. Everyone that did was, however,

burried with a big celebration as "Shaheed" or martyr. Only much later did some of the villagers start to wonder.

The chiefly families with the expensive automatic weapons never ran to where the Jews were supposed to be; it was below their dignity. They gave instructions from their headquarters in the Diwan. Their expensive weapons were later on turned over, almost unused, to the Israeli forces.

When the Israeli forces took over the village, members of the chiefly families tried to stay on top in their villages. They tried to deal with the Israeli soldiers, policemen, military rulers, and other government functionaries not as members of the old Jewish ethnic group, nor as the conquering enemy, but as the new foreign rulers, replacing the British and French, who in their turn once replaced the Turks. The British never interferred in the internal affairs in the Arab village and never disturbed or changed the ongoing system. They ruled through the chiefly aristocratic Arab families as did the Turks before them. The chiefly class members tried to intervene between the Israeli authorities and the village people. Two things, however, happened to frustrate the members of this class. They were dealt two blows--one from the ruler, Israel, and the other from their followers, the villagers. Israeli authorities refused their definition of the situation, refused to govern through them or to give them any authority over other villagers. The Israelis had a different philosophy and style of governing than the British. Their interests were different. They did not consider themselves foreign rulers but the rightful owners of the country. Security considerations did not allow them to let one class stand between them and the majority of the population. The fact that the Israeli authorities were aware that members of this class were the leaders in the fighting against Israel was not conducive to trust and friendship.

Thus, the Israelis treated members of this class in exactly the same way or somewhat worse than they treated every one in the village. Worse yet, they changed the criteria by means of which an Arab endeared himself to the authorities and gained their help and support. The new criteria is as how much one was ready to cooperate with the authorities mainly as an informant on other villagers. Some low class individuals who were servants and hired hands all of a sudden became much more influential than their masters. All this was extremely humiliating and degrading, and they refused to accept its reality.

On the other hand, members of the other two classes who did not mind physical work and did not mind working as laborers in Jewish towns started to draw better incomes than the chiefly class. This will be discussed in detail when we describe the adjustments of the other two classes. For now suffice it to say that through economic independence, the two lower classes gained social and psychological independence from the upper class. Worse yet they started to live even better than members of the upper class.

This again was very humiliating and degrading to members of the upper class, and they refused to accept its reality.

Members of the upper class decided that things could not continue like that; Israel is not permanent; things will change; the Arabs will win over the Jews sooner or later, and if man can not change the situation God will. He could not possibly want it to stay this way. Meanwhile, they decided not to be part of what is happening, not to participate in the whole degrading affair, to dissociate themselves from it all, and to wait it out until the help arrives. This started to become clear around 1950 and that was the time they stood still, economically,

socially and psychologically, and that is where they still are. The state of these people at the present time is sad and pitiful and almost comical. A look at their situation makes one feel that they have slept over twenty years and just woke up, but are not aware of how long they slept. Life of course went on for them but it went on almost inspite of them. They are still holding back; they refuse to be part of something they define as wrong and immoral. In many respects of course they are not fixated at the stage of early 1950's but they have regressed or degenerated.

For example, the Diwan's furniture has not been changed or even fixed or cleaned since then. It used to be the best in the village, now it is old and falling apart and strange because you do not see such items any more. This is true of almost everything they have in their homes. Most of these items were at some time the most modern and the only ones of their kind in the village, because nobody else could afford them. They are still the only ones of their kind because they are not in the market any longer and no one would want to buy things like them. These include huge ornate beds, huge ornate cupboards, sets of drawers, dressers, huge wall mirrors, alarm clocks with bells mounted on the outside, faded framed pictures from days when most people did not know the existence of photography, massive sofas, very old china, old massive radios, hand-cranked phonographs and many other items. Their clothes are still what they wore in the early 1950's when they were the innovators; the older men wearing the traditional Arabic costume while the younger one's shift back and forth between a full Arabic costume and a combination of a European suit with Arabic headgear. The younger ones may take the headgear off during their infrequent visits to Jewish towns, carry it in

a brown bag to put it on when they get to the outskirts of the village on their way back.

Economically they are very bad off and unless their style of adjustment somehow changes they will continue to move from bad to worse. When Israel took over they were of course the richest group in the village. Things have changed since then. The village is not as closed and self-sufficient as it once was. The economy has changed from a subsistence agriculture to cash economy. The land owners suffered for many reasons. Wages for labor have increased immensely, and most people would not want to work for anyone in the village even for better wages because it carries some unpleasant social connotations. Members of the upper class have not changed their work ethic enough to work their own land or in labor in Jewish towns. They have on many occasions approached the Israeli authorities for supervisory or white collar jobs for which they had no qualifications, and of course were either rejected or given temporary jobs until the Israeli authorities got what they wanted from them, such as the purchase of some of their land. The few agricultural crops they produced could not stand any competition against the cash crops produced by modern agricultural techniques in both Jewish and Arab towns. The only source of income left to them is to sell a few acres of land at a time, use up the money, then sell few more, and so on. Even this source is just about to dry up. This course has been a very painful process. To start with, the land has rewarded them so much in the past, it is meaningful, symbolic, almost sacred, and is not easy to part with. But more painful yet is that they have to sell it either to the Jews which would make any Arab feel like a traitor, or to members of the village lower classes which is extremely humiliating.

Generally they have found the first alternative more tolerable, but usually did it in extreme secrecy and denied the sale for a long time after it took place.

Socially they live in almost total isolation and interact only within themselves and with few older members of the lowest class who once were their servants and still have some loyalty toward them. They cannot make other people in the village interact with them the way they want and they refuse to change their definition of the situation. Other villagers avoid interacting with them because they find the pose they strike, that of superiority and leadership, as outrageous or amusing. The most understanding just pity them.

Members of the upper class, however, continue to keep the Diwan open, the coffee hot and ready, and the whole routine intact, as if the village men and the guests are about to arrive--but neither the village men nor the guests do any more because every villager now has a guest room in his house and can afford to feed and entertain his own guests and because the upper class members have lost all the leadership functions which used to attract the village men and the other guests to their Diwan. Only members of this class still play the game by the old definitions; they treat each other as chiefs and leaders. Every time the present researcher was around members of this class he was always reminded of ex-King Faroug's sister and mother whom he had met in Honolulu the previous year. The ex-king's sister always referred to the mother, in her own presence, as "Her Majesty the Queen Mother!"

When they are sitting together in the diwan their conversation usually have a totally different flavor from any other group in the village. A listener from the outside cannot help that these people

are not very much in reality. They do not usually talk about things that are relevant in terms of space, time, or even function. Most of the conversation usually revolves around chiefs, emirs, or kings, from the past, about their exploits in raids against other tribes, their generosity to their guests, their courage, amusing anecdotes that happened to them and so on. Some of these are people they had known personally sometime in the past, but some are people from lands far away, and from times long past. But listening to the conversation you would think they were talking about people who live or lived until very recently in the next village. Not only do they refuse to discuss timely or relevant issues but they also refuse to participate in or even sabotage any new projects that are carried out for the improvement of the village. Their homes were the only ones without running water. The streets in their section of the village were not paved. And they were strongly opposed to bringing electricity to the village. The physical structures of their houses have changed very little and they continue to live in them in large, over-populated extended families.

Politically, members of this class have not accepted the idea of organized political parties as a legitimate way of running a country. They especially despise the communist party to which most of the village people belong. They get involved in politics only when one of the Jewish parties, as was discussed previously, drafts someone from a chiefly family like them to run on a "list." In these cases they usually rally around the person, not the party or the issues.

The psychological health of this class is doing just as poorly as their social or economic adjustments. "Majaneen" or "crazy people" is the description quite often applied to them by other village people.

"Majaneen" is the plural of "Majnun" which literally means "Possessed" and in the exact sense applies to what Western psychiatry would call "psychotics."

The term is, however, used in a broad sense to mean something like the English terms "mad" or "foolish." In this broad sense it is used to describe anyone who, considering his own circumstances, is making a poor adjustment.

By poor adjustment is generally meant behavior that does not best serve the person's self interest by helping him to come closer to, maintain, or enhance, the position which a man under his circumstance is supposed to occupy. In short it is one who "Birifsh maslahat nafsuh;" does not know where his self interest lies. Thus the foolish behavior is the result of poor judgement, of something wrong in one's head. Differently phrased we can say that poor economical and social adjustment is seen to be symptomatic of poor mental health. The behaviors which the village people considered symptomatic of poor mental health among upper class people are not very different from those that a Western psychiatrist would have possibly pointed out. Thus member of the upper class members were judged or "diagnosed" to be "majaneen" by a wide variety of behaviors. They were considered "Majaneen" because they isolated themselves from other people and when they did interact with others they were very easily annoyed or offended which in turn caused other people to stay away from them. They were considered "majaneen" because they allowed their economical situation to deteriorate so badly by persisting in the same life style instead of taking advantage of the opportunities made available by the new circumstances. They were "majaneen" because they lacked insight in their

situation by continuing to consider themselves leaders when they actually had no followers left. They were "majaneen" because they supported the obviously loosing cause of Arab royalty whom all others considered traitors. They were "majaneen" for letting their fields go uncultivated, their olive groves neglected, and their house, run down. In general they were "majaneen" for not seeing reality as the other village people did and adjusting to it in ways which have been proven by others to be successful.

It must not be very easy to deny the reality of everything around them and to live in an almost imaginary world. We must assume that they either have totally succeeded in denying all the evidences of the failure of their adjustment and of the fact that the rest of the world is proceeding without them or they accept that they have no control over anything and will never be able to change it, or they have failed to do so. In the first case they would be totally out of touch with reality and therefore totally insane. In the second case, they would have suffered immensely in proceeding to live and act as they do knowing that they are helpless, hopeless, and very much doomed. Neither alternative is very healthy. The observer can see that they are not completely out of touch; the psychological flight into the world of Sheikhs, chiefs and kings is a pain killer but not a cure. Members of this group seem to be extremely bitter and hateful against almost everyone because everyone seems to be gaining at their own expense, everyone turned against them, preying on their prestige, on their property, and their influence, on their positions and functions. Even those who were once the poorest villagers, who begged to work for them, can now eat and dress better than they can, live in better houses than they do, and can

afford much more things than they can. To all this they have taken the "sour grapes" attitude, but underneath they are bitter and envious.

The villagers refuse to show them the respect and obedience they were used to, interaction with other villagers has ceased to be rewarding or actually has become insulting and humiliating and they withdrew from the field almost totally, they have become very uncommunicative, very irritable and very easily offended. They have lost the leadership positions and all the functions which went along with it, and which in the past kept them meaningfully occupied and made them feel useful, important and fulfilled. Now they mainly just hang around their homes and diwans unneeded and their company unsought by others. Their lives seem to be empty and meaningless. They look anxious, restless and not knowing what to do with themselves. Sometimes they exaggerate the importance of issues or items which other people consider childish. Two grown-up men of this class may be seen sitting for hours with one of them cutting his fingernails or toenails and both seriously discussing the activity, and the function of the nailclipper and where and how it was obtained and what the surrounding circumstances were and on and on as if it was the most vital issue in the world. Even physically they do not usually look very healthy and malnutrition may have something to do with it. The village people say that members of this class eat very poorly but would not want to give other villagers the satisfaction of knowing that about them. The observations of the present researcher confirms that view. Members of this class seem to complain more than others of physical illness and aches and pains. The most unhappy group of people in the village, to this observer, generally seemed to be these people.

Lower Class Adjustment

Members of this class also formed a small percentage of the population not larger than that of class A and possibly no more than ten percent. These were completely landless and depended for a very poor survival mainly on working for class A. A large part of this work was usually in farming the land but once a man of this class started working for a member of the upper class, both he and all members of his family became practically the property of the employer and did what they were told to do no matter how demeaning the work was. They usually lived in small shacks next to the animal sheds given to them by the landlord and ate generally leftovers from the landlords meals. Members of this class usually lived in small nuclear families because their style of existence did not allow for any larger units. Their's were the only units where male children left home even before marriage as soon as they became able to fend for themselves.

Very often they were not part of an integrated clan and although they identified with the hamula supporting them they often carried a different past name. Members of the same clan lived in several villages according to available opportunities. Sometimes the outsider may have had to flee his original village for committing crime like killing another man or having an affair with someone's wife or daughter. Others in this class were actually members of the hamula who somehow ended up without any land, either because they or one of their recent ancestors were mentally retarded or youngest among several brothers or the children of another wife than the mother of all the other children or some reason that enabled others, usually other brothers, to cheat them out of their land. Whatever the reason for being reduced to this status may have been, the results were very much the same; they were

treated as somewhat sub-human by others and highly demoralized and dehumanized in terms of their own self image and self estimate. They were considered kind of amoral, the rules of human decency did not apply to them very much. They were expected to live by, according to one single principle, and that was obtaining enough to eat and survive physically by any possible means. Even the most sacred thing in the Arab culture, the "honor" of their wives and daughters was not respected; their women usually became fair game to members of the upper class.

Like mad dogs and other stray animal members of this class were sometimes teased and toyed with by children or even adults of the other two classes. Members of this class naturally accepted the definition lived up to it, and generally clowned their way through life, quite possibly feeling that they were making fools out of the members of the upper class.

When the Arab-Jewish conflict started they cared very little about the wider implications of the situation beyond their own personal life and safety. In any change they could possibly go up only. They always looked at the bright side of any change and so only new opportunities. Becoming refugees would have been an improvement, so would have been going to jail. Any place where they could get food and hide their true identity would have been acceptable. The men from this class were the first to leave home and volunteer to join any group or organization to "fight the Jews." It gave them food, anonymity, and a sense of importance and personal value. Some of them actually became famous names, especially during the civil war with the Jewish settlers and the struggle against the British in the 1930's and 1940's. And some of their bands roamed the countryside and terrorized the Arab villagers in

the name of Arab nationalism. They set their camps in the mountains near the villages and demanded food, clothing, and other supplies, and held their own courts which hung and shot villagers who refused to cooperate as traitors to the Arab cause.

When Israel took over, again members of this class saw only new opportunities in the situation. They were the first to accept doing things that members of the other classes took quite a bit longer to accept. Thus they, very early, became informants to the Israeli authorities which at the beginning involved mainly informing about smugglers from Arab countries, dealers in the black market, villagers with hidden weapons, villagers who had left the village and just came back, refugees who secretly crossed the borders to find out what happened to relatives left behind, villagers who make negative statements about Israel or Jews, and so on. At the same time these same informants, under the protection of the authorities did some smuggling and dealt in the black market. Their best rewards, however, were the permission to go to Jewish towns. This gave members of this class, for a while, a monopoly over a wide open job market which we will describe in more detail a little later. At the beginning they just went to towns like Acre, Haifa, Hadera, Ramat Gan and Jaffa, and roamed the streets asking for work. At night they slept mainly in the ruins of the Arab homes bordering the Jewish section, in a deserted mosque, in bus depots and so on.

Soon these bunking places became labor markets where employers came and announced what they wanted and asked who would accept the lowest wages.

This usually resulted in lots of physical fights among the workers and the employers got all the help he needed for minimal wages. Being

demoralized to start with and becoming more so due to this situation, the workers accepted any kind of work for any pay, including male prostitution. Several of them stood in the middle of the street and bargained over the price with a Jewish homosexual.

Naturally these same bunking places became popular spots with female prostitutes of the city. It is ironical that for a while among the Arab laborer in Jewish cities the word "mosque" came to have the connotation of prostitution. At the beginning members of this group returned to the village quite often and inspite of the low wages earned, they had the most cash of any group in the village.

They tried to use this money to enhance their prestige in the village but were not very successful. For one thing, the rest of the villagers knew how the money was earned and despised them for it. For another they used the money in ways that, instead of earning them respect, made them look humorous. They tried to imitate the rich but came out like caricatures of rich people. They just behaved in ways that did not fit them. For example, they bought neckties and showed them off to everyone in the village but had no idea how to use them. They bought radios but could not understand the classical Arabic used by the broadcasters and made fools out of themselves misusing the terms they heard on the radio. One young man whose father used to be one of the poorest men in the village, built himself a small house and installed in it a battery operated door bell--the first and only one since or ever. Not only did this strike the other villagers as very humorous but they also kept wondering who was ever going to visit him and use that bell.

Failing to earn the rewards they wanted from the village people and drawn by the attractions of the city gradually their visits to the

village became less and less frequent. At the same time to gain access to what the city had to offer they had to deny their identities and try to pass as Jews--of course, as oriental Jews.

The group they emulated most were the ones easiest to come in contact with on the streets of the city and these are young Moroccan Jews who, for reasons of their own, are considered thieves, pimps, dope addicts, criminals and generally the lowest class Jews in Israel. Thus the most successful among those young Arabs managed to successfully pass for the lowest class Jewish criminals in the city slums. The less successful ones were detected more often, beaten up, thrown in jail, returned to the village to start all over again. The more successful ones of course turned into drug addicts, pimps, male prostitutes, gamblers, and whatever other opportunities the city slums had to offer them.

Sooner or later almost all of them complete the cycle and return to the village. Some come back on their own after getting tired of that style of life. Some give up after a succession of failures to pass for Jews, others are forced by the Israeli authorities to stay in the village. What ever the road they take back to the village, somewhere along the way back they usually discover Arab nationalism mostly through the communist party. At this stage they generally earn the respect of the villager by being mature, serious, strongly nationalist and anti-Israeli, generally more refined more knowledgeable about the outside world, more courageous and outspoken than young men who have not gone through such experiences.

The pattern described here did not occur only once but is occurring as a continuing process which almost all the young men of the lower class undergo. Many members of the middle class who start work in the Jewish cities at every early age undergo the same process. There are always

young men from the village at each stage of this pattern. In its totality the whole process seems to function as a factory for the production of young nationalist or communist Arabs among the Israeli Arab minority.

Those who complete this cycle have the tendency to marry girls from the cities such as Nazareth or Acre, who themselves are usually very low class city girls. The reason for this is that these boys want to avoid being rejected by the fathers of the village girls who still continue to evaluate their daughters prospective husbands by family status rather than by personal characteristics. These boys usually take a sour grapes attitude and let it be known that they consider themselves sophisticated for the village girls. Marriage to the low class city girl usually enhances the prestige of the boy in the village.

Such young men after completing the cycle usually try to pull members of their extended family together, try to induce in them self respect and a sense of personal worth. In particular the older "uncle Tom" type members of the family are usually bought new respectable clothes and supplied with whatever they need, especially cigarettes and coffee in order to stop them from lowering themselves to others to obtain what they wanted.

As a result low class families are generally much more solid and integrated units than they ever were before, and the line between the middle and the lower classes is fast disappearing.

Middle Class Adjustment

Members of this class formed the backbone of the village community and of the Middle Eastern society in general. They were the classical

traditional Middle Eastern peasants whose style of life represented the Middle East to the outside world. Before the establishment of Israel members of this class generally owned enough land to, barely, make a living for his generally large family. Members of this class dedicated all their lives to working the land and considered themselves above working for anyone else or doing any other kind of work besides farming. They formed possibly about sixty to seventy percent of the Arab population in Palestine and their ratio among the Israeli-Arabs is larger because a much higher ratio of rich, educated and city people than of peasants left the country during the war.

The style of adjustment of this class to life in Israel is the major one and is the only one that is usually noticed by an outsider visiting Israel. It is also the economic and material aspect of this style of adjustment that Israel likes to show off and to get credit for. In the long run, unless a drastic change occurs, this style of adjustment will possibly become the only one among the Israeli-Arabs because the other two types previously mentioned and which could be called "adjustment by denial" and "adjustment by assimilation" are being very unsuccessful and resulting in more and more young men forsaking their class and joining the middle class adjustment which could be called "adjustment by hostile competition." This last one is very similar to what Devereux and Loeb (1943) called "antagonistic acculturation" and includes elements clearly borrowed from Israel and from the Western world in general for the purpose of competing with and maybe ultimately winning against the lender of these items. It also includes some elements from previous stages of the Moslem-Arab culture for the purpose of distinguishing themselves clearly from the donner group with whom they are competing. This manifests itself in a revived interest

in and glorification of the Ancient Arab history; a revival of names of culture heros from pre-Islamic or early-Islamic eras, a flood of nationalistic Arabic poetry from the pens of Hebrew university educated young men, a return to the use of the Arabic headdress among the Arab leaders of the communist party, and so on.

The revival of classical Arabic names often results in some amusing name patterns that in themselves tell a long story. This becomes specially striking in the names of some Christian Arab children, because for a while Christians in the Arab countries identified themselves with the European powers and used European names. The Arabic naming system is such that an individual usually states his first name, his father's first name and his (paternal) grandfather's name. Possibly only a native speaker of Arabic can appreciate the irony in the name of the little daughter of the present researcher's friend. Her name was Reem George Asaad. The irony is in the combination of the classical Arabic first name Reem, the European name of the father George, and the seedy village sounding name of the grandfather Asaad.

Let us now go back and find out how this adjustment came about.

Palestinian peasants were generally poor; theirs was an economy of subsistence. The peasant hardly produced anything that was not needed and consumed by his family. Anything in excess of that was bartered for the few necessary "luxuries" the villager allowed himself--tea, coffee, sugar, new dress for the wife and a few other things. Cash was so scarce that whole villages took to the mountains when the word spread that the tax collector was coming to the village to collect the head tax imposed by the Mandate authorities. When Israel was established, Jewish immigrants flooded the country. The government, the Jewish

Agency and the Histadrut got busy creating housing for the thousands of immigrants coming in. The country also needed to be mechanized and industrialized. It could not support its fast increasing population from agriculture since the whole area of the State was very small. Also roads and highways were badly needed. All this needed manpower, mainly unskilled manpower for construction. The Jewish sector could not supply the needed manpower. The country was surrounded by enemies threatening revenge, and Israel had to be continuously prepared and on the alert. Every Israeli capable of carrying arms was needed in the armed forces more even than in the civilian labor force. The settlers in the agricultural settlements did both; they farmed and fought according to the need of the moment. The same could not be done by industrial and construction workers in the urban areas. That was not where the enemy was. One group supplied a large part of the answer--the Arab minority.

The Arab minority had a large supply of unemployed manpower. The Arabs did not join the armed forces. A large number of them had no land left to work on. Even those families that kept their lands had many adult males to spare. Dry farming required only a few months of work out of the whole year anyway. At the same time Arab villages had almost reached a state of famine because the war had interrupted all economical activities. Most villagers did not get to cultivate any crops. Those who did not were not able to harvest their crops because they were afraid to get out to the fields, because the crops were stolen before they ripened, because the crops were destroyed by the war, or because the land was taken over by the Israeli authorities.

Thus, Arab labor was badly needed in the Jewish sector and Arab laborers were anxious to get to Jewish towns and cities to get work.

But areas of Arab concentration were placed under military regime which imposed emergency regulations on them. Arabs needed passes to get from place to place, especially to enter Jewish towns. The rules were very strictly enforced and punishment for violations was severe. The Israeli military regime took full advantage of this critical situation. Passes to places of work were used very effectively as positive and negative rewards. The threat of being denied a pass to a place of work was possibly the one most effective tool used to tame, subjugate and breakdown any form of resistance among the Arab minority in Israel. Ultimately every Arab who needed a job badly enough--and most of them did--declared--explicitly or implicitly--his loyalty to the State of Israel and got his pass. Since that time huge amounts of money have come into the Arab villages from labor. At the beginning the money from labor was used to achieve and further traditional goals and to compete with relatives, neighbors or members of the next Hamula along lines decided by traditional Middle Eastern value system. A great deal of money actually went into three traditionally valued goals summarized in an Arabic saying which goes something like this: "When a peasant becomes rich, you can be sure what he'll do: get himself another wife, get his son a wife or add another room to his house." And this is actually what happened. Some of the Arab villages have been almost completely rebuilt and greatly expanded since 1950. Bride-price sky-rocketed from a few Israeli liras to about IL.10,000. Brides started to demand one kilogram (Lb 2.2) of gold jewelry before the wedding day. Villagers filled their homes with cheap colorful objects such as artificial flowers, plastic dishes, framed pictures, colorful wall rugs, colorful but cheap clothes, colored glass windows, transistor

radios and many other items. Gradually, however, the attraction of these objects started to fade out. And as the Arab villager started to get used to the idea of cash in his pocket, as he became more and more exposed to the culture and values of the Jewish population, and as he, more and more, realized that Jewish people looked down upon him, his priorities started to change. The next step was to dedicate more and more money, time and effort to the improvement of agricultural production. The model which the peasant tried to copy is of course the Jewish farmer. Modern agricultural machinery was bought. The use of fertilizers and insecticides became quite common. Farmers became much more productive and started to turn more and more toward the production of cash crops. Arab farmers became more and more specialized in the production of crops which require a lot of work by hand but command high prices, such as tobacco, sesame seed and olive oil. These improvements never brought the Arab farmer to the same level of productivity as the Jewish farmer (see previous chapter), but did add a lot to the prosperity of the Arab village. They, especially the ones with less land, started also to use those who did not have lands their newly acquired money for the education of their children. At the present time most of the educated class in the Arab villages come from the lower-middle rather than the upper class as used to be the case during the British days. Parents who never learned how to read or write show great pride in their sons who had become teachers in the village school or have acquired some sort of white collar employment.

The third stage in the overall adjustment of this class which formes the majority in Israel is the emergence of a sense of community, of group solidarity and identity at a level above that of the Hamula.

Of course, an incipient Arab nationalism existed among the Palestinian Arab peasants during the Mandate period. There was also an incipient Palestinian nationalism. The latter fizzled out completely after the Arab exodus from Palestine. It has recently re-emerged among Palestinian refugees in the Arab countries as a result of disillusionment with the Arab countries and leaders to solve the Palestinian problem and as a result of discrimination against them by other Arabs. This brand of nationalism has not caught on very strongly among the Arab minority in Israel, most probably because they did not share the same experiences with the Palestinian refugees. Arab nationalism on the other hand never disappeared from among the Arab minority in Israel, and has been becoming more and more popular technique for adjusting to life with the Jewish people in Jewish state. They have always thought of themselves as part of an Arab nation with which they strongly identified. From 1953 on, Nasser represented that unit for them. Even in 1969-70 when this research was carried out, and after the 1967 defeat, the Arab minority's hero was still Nasser and not Arafat. Since Arab nationalism has always been--quite understandably--taboo in Israel it disguised itself mainly in the form of Communism which ultimately cause the Israel Communist party to break up into two Communist parties; one Jewish and one Arab. From conversations with Arabs in the Western Bank and individuals from Arab countries in the United States, the present researcher believes that Arab nationalism sentiments are generally stronger among members of the Arab minority in Israel than any other group in the Arab countries. Four possible reasons for this phenomenon are:

1. Every minority group has a strong psychological need to identify

with a larger group to which it can anchor itself against assimilation and as a defense mechanism against feelings of inferiority and insecurity.

2. It is possibly more than a method to defend oneself; it can be a tool by which to aggravate, to offend, to hurt the other group, psychologically.

3. The Arab minority is not a party to the conflicts among the different Arab countries which make them emphasize a local brand of nationalism at the expense of an overall Arab nationalism.

4. Israel has constantly weeded out naturally emerging leaders who are acceptable to a large number of Arabs by preventing the Arabs from forming their own political parties. This lack of leadership forces the Arabs to look up to leaders in the Arab countries.

In short, we can say that Arab nationalism among the Israeli-Arabs is a reaction to their life with people they do not identify with in a state which they feel was imposed upon them.

The message they are sending by their nationalism is possibly something like this: "We refuse to accept your definition of the situation; we are good too, and we are going to continue to improve and one day we will be good enough to defeat you on your own terms, using your own methods and techniques."

They are saying that they are good by showing that they are an integral part of a large, strong, good nation with a glorious history--the Arab nation. However, more interesting to us and more important for their own material, social and emotional adjustment is the way they defined improvement or progress for themselves. They did not see it in revival of the past, they did not see it in turning to terrorism and they did not see it in blindly assimilating to the Jewish society.

Inspired by the Israeli example they saw "improvement" as education and modernization. Luckily for them they did not see this kind of improvement as a monopoly for Israel or the West, where one cannot "improve" without becoming Jewish or European. They did not call it modernity or Westernization. It has the same contents but they call it "Tagaddum," literally moving forward i.e., progress. This made it possible for them to copy the Israeli or other European example for the purpose of enhancing the Arab cause by becoming "progressive Arabs resulting in the best kind of Arab--a progressive Arab nationalist.

This philosophy is being carried out at all levels or organization. At the individual level a strong work ethic is emerging and is summarized in the often heard phrase: "no shame in working." This is, of course, quite different from the old work ethic when one proved his worthiness by not having to work. The most often mentioned cause for working hard is "to give my children the education I did not have. I don't want my children to grow up ignorant like me. Look at me, I cannot read the paper, I don't even know what is going on in the world around me. Look at the Jews, all they have achieved is because of education."

Most important is that in most Arab villages different Hamulas are forgetting their traditional conflicts and cooperating on projects that benefit the whole village, such as paving the streets, bringing running water into the village, bringing electricity into the village, building a new school and similar projects. This is not done through the village council. Members of the village council in Arab villages are very much of the same caliber as the Arab members of the Knesset and are selected through a very similar process (~~see previous chapter~~).

Thus council members usually command very little respect or trust among their subjects. They are mainly the traditional family heads and are little concerned with such projects as running water and electricity, they are mainly concerned about the traditional concerns of their Hamulas. Even if they cared they generally lack the education and the information to organize and carry out such projects.

The ones who have the necessary elements, enthusiasm, dedication, education and integrity are usually disliked by the Israeli authorities and the Israeli political parties because these are also usually Communist, nationalist or fiercely independent young people, who tend to be anti-establishment. The new type of young Arab leaders almost always combine these two clusters of characteristics because in order to be a trusted leader one has to prove that he has not "sold out" to the government authorities or to the Israeli parties since most Arabs are suspicious of both. On the other hand, Israeli authorities are suspicious of all Arabs in Israel and follow a general policy that excludes independence among Arabs, and can be summarized thus. If you are not with us, you are against us. Also a Jew in Israel can get by with being anti-establishment. Not so with an Arab--an anti-establishment Arab is equal to an anti-Israeli Arab as far as the Israeli authorities are concerned. The result is simple--if you are liked by the Arabs you are hated by the Jews and vice versa. These conditions cause change and progress in the Arab villages to be slow. The Israeli authorities are not really interested in initiating any costly projects in the Arab village for the reasons discussed in earlier chapters. To the contrary, they even oppose most of those initiated by the Arabs themselves because they are opposed to the only type of leadership acceptable to

the Arab minority. Most of the projects that get carried out take place on election years through the support of different parties including the ruling party at the initiative of the Arab people themselves in clear attempts to become "as good as the Jewish towns."

One interesting point in relation to the adjustment of the Arab minority in Israel concerns the inter-hamula relationships in the village. As was previously stated there is much more cooperation between members of the different hamulas than ever before. The causes for this are many. Important among these is the emergence of new higher level or wider reference groups or identification groups. Previously the highest level reference group for a village Arab was the hamula, and on few occasions when inter-village conflict became strong, the individual identified with the village as a whole.

The Israeli-Arab conflict created new and meaningful levels of identification namely the Israeli-Arab minority and the Arab nation in addition to a much stronger identification with the village as a whole. It is the nature of the Middle Eastern social structure that activation of any level of identification brings around conciliation between the units at the lower levels for the purpose of strengthening the higher level unit. This capacity for "fission and fusion" (Evans-Pritchard 1949) has always been an inherent characteristic of Middle Eastern social structure. This state of inter-hamula harmony and cooperation was enhanced by other factors. One factor is the friendships which emerge between member young men from different hamulas when they work in the same Jewish town under adverse conditions and have no one else to turn to except each other. Another factor is the emergence of new membership groups which cut across the hamula lines, such as political parties, labor unions, schools, clubs, etc.

All these factors resulted in more interaction, communication and cooperation among the different hamulas of the village, especially among the young. This gave some observers the impression that the traditional hamula structure in the village is disappearing. Actually the whole thesis of Abner Cohen's book "Arab Border Villages" (1965) is that the traditional hamula structure which supposedly disappeared during the British Mandate days was being revived shortly after the establishment of Israel. The fact is that the hamula structure did not disappear during the Mandate days--and is not disappearing now. That is simply the nature of the beast. As we said before the capacity for "fission and fusion" is an inherent part of the social structure and is a built-in cultural adaptive mechanism by means of which the social units respond to infringement from other units outside themselves.

Despite all the apparent harmony in Al-Karya for example, the hamula structure and divisions is as real to the minds of the village people themselves as it ever was. And if an observer wanted to see how the divisions along hamula lines can be immediately revived and put into action all he had to do is to visit any of the Arab villages few days before the elections for the village council when the interests of the hamula take precedence over the interests at higher levels.

Other observers have also talked about the fast downfall of the extended family in the Israeli-Arab villages since the establishment of Israel; (e.g., Rosenfield ¹⁹⁵⁸ 1960).

This is again more superficial than authentic basic change in the nature structure. To start with we should realize that the extended family unit is not and never was the minimal unit in the Middle Eastern social structure. Middle Eastern people themselves perceive the extended family as consisting of smaller units similar to nuclear

families and those consisting of individuals. The system is capable of "fission and fusion" at these levels all the way down to the individual.

Another point is the way we define an extended family or any of the units at the different levels of the Middle Eastern social structure.

It is true that the physical layout of a Middle Eastern village traditionally corresponds very closely with the map of the kinship system in the village and that members of an extended family tended generally to live in the same house or compound.

And if we were to make physical residence within the same house or compound as a major criterion in the definition of an extended family then the observer would be justified in saying that the extended family structure in the Israeli-Arab village is falling apart. The present investigator, however, would contend that physical residence is not and never was a major criterion for the existence of the extended family in the minds of Middle Eastern people themselves.

The psychological reality of the extended family is derived not from common residence but from the feeling of identification with and responsibility for the well being of all the members of that unit; a sense of obligation to give moral, emotional, financial and physical support to all members of the unit we are calling extended family. The ultimate test for the existence of the extended family as a unit is not where the different members live but whether or not the members of that unit will pull back together and act as a unit to defend and support each and every member of that unit in the case of conflict with other units at the same level, in this case members of other extended families from the same clan.

If this definition of extended family is accepted then the present researcher would maintain the view that the extended family unit in the

Israeli-Arab villages has become much stronger rather than weaker during the recent years. Previously many extended families, especially from the lower-middle and lower classes, fell apart became of economic reasons. Old parents, uncles, aunts, etc., who owned no land, and female and young dependent siblings were heavy burdens, which many young male adults foresook, in favor of their own and own children's survival. This situation has changed; dependent children are subsidized by the government, dependent adults receive social security and welfare payments, many women have entered the labor, market, and anyone willing to work can earn enough to support his family. Under the new condition no one has to dissociate himself psychologically from his relatives for economic reasons.

Another reason which previously induced some people to dissociate themselves from relatives and which has since disappeared is closely related to the first one. This is the fact that previously all those who did not have enough land depended on other members of the hamula for their living.

Such people quite often dissociated themselves from members of their extended family when these came in conflict with richer or stronger extended families of the hamula. The newly achieved economical independence of the previously poor is enabling members of this group to stick by their relatives in conflict even with the rich and they even seem to enjoy defying the authority of their previous benefactors.

Also, the general enhancement in the sense of self-respect of many village people, especially the young, due to economical independence, Arab Nationalism, education, improved health care and so on, is making many young men willing to fulfill what they consider their obligations toward their close relatives.

Finally, since one's prestige and self-image is so tied up with his family pulling together and strengthening one's extended family is a method of social climbing, of improving one's prestige in the society.

Another point which the present investigator feels is not properly understood by observers of the Israeli-Arab scene is the relationship between the generations. There is supposed to be a great deal of conflict between the old and the young in the village. Thus Weingrod (1965:70) after stating that the extended family has been "weakened considerably" adds "conflicts between generations are also typical, as the youngsters actively contest for control of the village."

Again the statement is somewhat justified, but applies only to the very superficial level without getting to the underlying reality. Any-one visiting the village can easily see that a group of young men are emerging as the new leaders and they are taking over all the responsibilities from the older traditional land-owner-leader. But a closer look would show that the significant dimension in the struggle is class and not age. It is not the children or grandchildren of the old traditional leaders who are actively contesting for control of the village from their parents or grandparents. Nor are the new emerging young leaders competing with their own parents or grandparents because the latter never were nor ever aspired to being leaders. The contest is between the old from one class, the previously upper land owning class, and the young from the middle peasant class. Actually it is the whole upper class, led by the old, which is loosing out to the whole middle class, led by the young. The dynamics of this struggle and the resulting changes were outlined above in the discussion of the different adjustments. The casual observer may not realize how much harmony, sympathy, and understanding there is between the different generations of the same class. The young

among the upper class do strongly support the leadership of their parents and grandparents, and these continue to prepare the young of their class for future leadership and other village people notice the continuity across the generations and cynically remark "Farkh el-butt Awam," which literally means "a baby duck is a good swimmer" and is used to mean "like father like son."

As for the middle class which forms the great majority of the village people there are easily noticeable differences in clothes, hair style, education, sophistication in politics and world affairs, amount of exposure to the outside world, knowledge of the Hebrew language and many other observable items. But "different" does not necessarily mean conflict or even lack of unity. Psychologically and emotionally the old and the young of this class are together, they support and identify with each other; they complement each other. The old are trying to do all they can to give their children an education. And when these children emerge as leaders, in whatever field it may be, they are happy and they support them. The young leaders are the fulfillment of the dreams of generations of poor, hungry, and oppressed peasants. Tears come into the eyes of older men when they see the young men who are their children walking in the street looking clean and healthy and with heads raised like decent self-respecting human beings, and the old men with great satisfaction remark: "Mithl awlad el-umara," "They look like the sons of chiefs!"

General economic prosperity, the economical independence of the young, new access to education and to means of communication are supposed to create disruption and gaps between the young and the old. It has not worked out that way in case of the Israeli-Arab villages. It has brought many previously disrupted families back together and has

further strengthened the psychological and emotional binds within the ones that are already strong. It gave many a father the chance to realize his dream--to "rest" and have his grown up children carry the load and support him.

It also gave many a young man the chance to live up to the Middle Eastern and Moslem image of the ideal man--one who takes good care of his old parents and of his women folk.

In short, the conflict between the generations in the Israeli-Arab villages is possibly less now than it ever was.

As was mentioned at the beginning of this paper the adjustments described so far apply to villagers who form the great majority of the Arabs in Israel. They possibly do not apply quite as well to the previously nomadic bedouin tribes of the Negev desert and the Galilee, nor to the residents of the "mixed" cities like Acre, Haifa and Jaffa. The present investigator made no special effort to study the styles of adjustment of these groups and will make only few remarks about them.

The adjustment of the bedouin tribes is possibly completely different from what was described for the villages. Nomadic bedouins are supposed to be fiercely independent. Their identification never went beyond the borders of the tribe. The idea of Arab nationalism has, possibly, never meant anything to them. Nor do they identify even with the Arab minority in Israel. Bedouins are not known for their loyalty. They have always been considered fickle and treacherous and their general philosophy of life is to support the strong. And when Israel won they supported Israel and still do. Their young men volunteered for the Israeli army and most of the tribes have asked to, and actually became subject to the draft just like the Jewish citizens of the country. Quite possibly the major factor in their adjustment is

not the clash of identities or loyalties but the fact that they are being forced to change over from a nomadic style of life to a settled agricultural one.

The Arab people in the "mixed" cities in Israel are possibly having the hardest time making a satisfactory adjustment to life under the new conditions. There are several reasons for this. One reason is that, as was discussed in a previous chapter, all the leaders, the educated, the upper and middle class among the city people left the country during the war. The only ones left in the cities were the very poor, the very old, the physically or mentally handicapped and so on. They did not form a community but rather a conglomeration of misfits. A second factor is that Arab nationalism started, and has always been strong, among the city dwellers. The war started in the cities and the city people were most directly involved in it. They also fought not against impersonal Israeli or Jewish forces but against Jewish people who have lived in the same city and even some neighborhood for a long time. The result of the war was, therefore, more of a personal defeat for them than for other Arab groups.

In spite of all this the dwellers of the "mixed" cities are the ones who have the greatest deal of contact and interaction, in their daily lives, with the Jewish people and consequently the ones most subjected to the hostilities and discrimination. Because they live in cities which are mainly Jewish, they are potentially the most dangerous among all Israeli Arabs. Consequently they have always been subject to the greatest deal of surveillance and security regulations. It is no wonder that almost all the Israeli-Arabs who were discovered to belong to the Arab organizations came from the cities rather than the villages. It is the impression of the present investigator that the Arabs in the

"mixed" cities tend to take one or the other of two types of extremist adjustment. The one type is the assimilationist which was previously described for the low class, village young men when they get to the city. The second type is that of an exaggerated extreme Arab nationalism combined with very bitter anti-Jewish anti-Israeli sentiments of a degree not found among the village people.

The most prevailing adjustment in the village, which falls somewhat halfway between these two and which we described as "antagonistic acculturation" does not seem to prevail in the city.

The claim is sometimes made that the more any two mutually hostile groups are exposed to each other the less will be the hostility and the more the understanding and the harmony.

The examples usually given come from integrated schools or neighborhoods in U.S. cities. This view is possibly too simplistic. The results of the interaction among the members of any two groups must depend on many factors. In Israel the results of increased interaction has almost invariably resulted in increased hostility, at least on the side of the Arabs involved in the interaction. Again, many Israelis had hoped that as more Arabs become educated in Israeli schools and colleges the hostility of the Arab minority would decrease. The results are decidedly to the opposite. On the whole it can be said that the higher the education, and the more the exposure to the Jewish community, of a young Arab the greater his nationalist, anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish sentiments are. The Arab students at the Hebrew university probably form the most homogeneously nationalist anti-Israeli group among the Israeli-Arabs. "Arab intellectuals in Israel are intensely politically minded, smarting under the injustice (real or imaginary) of

the present and passionately eager for a different future..." (Landau 1969: 48). They are on-the-whole an unhappy and dissatisfied group. The one's unemployed among the intellectuals are naturally the most outspoken in expressing their dissatisfaction. "In other words, mass education at all levels in the State of Israel has raised a growing group of Arab high school or university graduates, dissatisfied and ready to criticize the State and its Government for nationalist or communist promises. Those who are unemployed, either by force of circumstances or personal choice, are even more inclined to extremism in their political attitudes." (Landau 1969: 43).

Those intellectuals who find employment are possibly not much happier than the unemployed. The great majority of those employed work for the Government, mainly in teaching. Although they are smarting under the same real or imaginary injustices, to paraphrase Landau, the fear of loosing their jobs stops them from voicing any criticisms or even any opinions of their own. This usually results in their avoidance of any situations where political issues may be raised or discussed which in turn leads to almost total isolation from most of the community. Members of the community on the other hand respond by considering such individuals as cowards or even accusing them of having "sold out."

To recapitulate, what has been said in this paper is that the adjustment made by the Arabs in Israel to the situation they found themselves in is mixed but on the main healthy. Thus we find that those who were previously the advantaged and wealthy are making a very poor and non-adaptive type of adjustment. We also find that the young among the previously deprived low class go through some traumatic experience before making a reasonably healthy adjustment. Again, most of the Arab

residents of the "mixed" cities, and most of the highly educated and the intellectuals are frustrated and bitter. All these groups combined make up, possibly, around 30 percent of the Arab citizens of Israel.

The other 70 or so percent are making a fairly healthy adjustment under the present circumstances.

The criteria for healthy adjustment used here is the decrease in the degree of subjectively felt pain, unhappiness and misery and the increase in the degree of subjectively felt satisfaction with self and with the rest of the world in relation to the self as these are subjectively reported by the people themselves and objectively manifested in their own behavior. This type of "healthiness" was brought around, to summarize and reiterate, by the following considerations, among others:

1. Alleviating the level of poverty which previously was below the minimal level needed for a sense of physical, and consequently psychological, well being.
2. Improving the diet which previously left many people below the minimal level required for a sense of physical and consequently psychological well being.
3. Improving medical and general health care which previously was a cause of very high rate of child mortality and of illness, general ill-health, disease, and misery.
4. The sense of competition with Israel and with the Jews and the desire to enhance the cause of Arab nationalism and maybe even the cause of the Third World in general gave a large number of Israeli-Arabs a cause to work for, to live for, made their lives meaningful.
5. All the above factors combined with the economic liberation and the resulting social liberation of the lower classes gave many Arabs a sense of achievement, a feeling of self-importance and human dignity.

6. Conflicts among the different hamulas have immensely decreased (although the conflict among extended families of the same hamula have possibly increased).

7. All the above factors combined resulted in the virtual disappearance of things which previously plagued the village and caused a great deal of anguish, such as stealing for economical gain or for spiting other hamulas; spiteful and vengeful destruction of property, killing of animals, chopping down of orchard trees, burning of ripe crops of members of other hamulas or even sometimes of one's own hamula.

8. The continuation, and in many cases the strengthening of the emotional and spiritual ties among members of the extended family while at the same time the economical causes for the intra-extended family friction and conflict are gradually eroding.

On the other hand perfection is not one of the most patient characteristics of human situations and we should not get the impression that it is one of the characteristics of the Israeli-Arabs adjustment.

The continuous feeling of hostility and competition between the two peoples, the continuous threat of war, the continuous struggle between the different classes within the village, the perpetual suspicion and insecurity resulting from the real or imaginary omnipresence of informants, spies, and secret police agents, the continuous exposure to a people who consider them both a hated enemy and an inferior people, the repeated failure of the Arab countries to come to terms with Israel, the overpowering and infuriating support of the West, and the United States in particular, for Israel, all these and many other stressful factors are taking their toll of tear and wear in the nervous system, of the Arab population in Israel, even the best adjusted among them.

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